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Abstract  
This article reviews Alex Anievas and Kerem Nişancıoğlu’s How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical 
Origins of Capitalism (2014). It argues that the book offers a stimulating and ambitious approach to solve 
the problems of Eurocentrism and the origins of capitalism in growing critical scholarship in historical 
sociology and International Relations. However, by focusing on the ‘problem of the international’ and 
proposing a ‘single unified theory’ based on uneven and combined development, the authors present a 
history of international relations that trades off methodological openness and legal complexity for a 
structural and exclusive consequentialism driven by anti-Eurocentrism. By misrepresenting the concept of 
social-property relations in terms of the internal/external fallacy, and by confusing different types of 
‘internalism’ required by early modern jurisdictional struggles, the book problematically conflates histories 
of international law and capitalism. These methodological problems are contextualised by examples from 
the Spanish, French and British empires’ conceptions of sovereignty and jurisdiction and their significant 
legal actors and processes. 
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In How the West Came to Rule (HWCR), Anievas and Nişancıoğlu set themselves two ambitious tasks. The 
first is to enrich an allegedly stagnant debate on the origins of capitalism by drawing from a variety of 
secondary sources, and by engaging with a broad range of critical International Relations (IR) theories. 
The second is to make a radical proposition to scholars of historical sociology in the form of a 'single, 
unified theory of socio-historical change’ (44). Based on Trotsky's theory of uneven and combined 
development (U&CD), this theory ultimately seeks to incorporate the role of external, geopolitical or 
intersocietal relations. Accordingly, U&CD implies a ‘spatial widening of our analytical imaginary’ and 
constitutes the necessary step to non-Eurocentrism (11). 'Cascading and multilayered', these ‘geo-social’ 
(11) relations are chiefly represented by the geopolitical pressures and technological advances brought to 
the West by the Amerindian ‘New World’, the Mongolian and Ottoman empires, and polities of the 
																																								 																				
1 I would like to thank Claire Vergerio, Javier Moreno Zacares, Benno Teschke, and the anonymous reviewers for 
their comments on previous drafts. All errors remain my own. 
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Indian Ocean; in other words, the non-European colonised, exploited and enslaved peoples consequently 
reduced to the ‘Other’.  
HWCR significantly contributes to a better understanding and explaining of the endurance of 
Eurocentrism in the social sciences. The longstanding failure to theoretically incorporate non-European 
agency into histories of capitalism and modernity perpetuates a Eurocentric historical sociology found in 
both postcolonial and Marxist scholarship.2 As the Marxist tradition continues its struggle to go beyond 
the ideal-typical fallacies of the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’, Anievas and Nişancıoğlu propose 'an alternative 
structural and conjunctural explanation' (246) to the rise of the West and thereby raise the stakes of how 
to tackle Eurocentrism.  
If they firstly define capitalism as a set of social relations over the capital relation,3 their contribution is 
also centred on the process of coercion.4 Accordingly, one can only appropriately integrate non-European 
agency through a definition of capitalism as an intersocietal set of social relations that coercively 
reproduces itself. The present analysis is concerned with the problem of the intersocietal as a primary 
ontological unit for historicising the origins and development of capitalism. Its function for the authors is 
to provide structural definitions of capitalism and modernity without getting caught in the ‘Eurocentric 
cage’ (6), i.e. by escaping the so-called internalist pitfalls of positivist and critical historical sociologies that 
remain trapped in treating Europe ‘as the privileged locale and organic birthplace of capitalist modernity’ 
(Ibid.) This 'single unified theory' built on 'the intersocietal' is, accordingly, the only solution to 
Eurocentrism. This article questions this conclusion by exploring how this conceptual apparatus - 
according to which early modern social relations are externally causally connected - applies to legal 
sovereignty and jurisdictional conflicts and to the specificities of the origins of capitalism.  
For historical materialism - a dialectical approach based on the assumption that human beings, and by 
extension their institutions, are mediated by social relations - the use of 'the international' as a primary 
ontological assumption is problematic. It has become more and more tempting to give in to this 
abstraction under the pressure of the 'neo' structural turn in IR following neoliberal and neorealist 
theories. Proponents of U&CD at the forefront of its recent revival in historical sociology have been 
particularly keen to take on neorealism for its ahistoricism and scientific approach divorced from any 
conceptualisation of the social.5 However, as the following will show, this has been accompanied by a 
																																								 																				
2 Matin, 2013; Bhambra, 2011 
3 Capitalism is defined "as a set of configurations, assemblages, or bundles of social relations and processes oriented 
around the systematic reproduction of the capital relation, but not reducible – either historically or logically – to that 
relation alone." (9; original emphasis) 
4 Capitalism "could only emerge, take root and reproduce itself – both domestically and internationally – through a 
violent, coercive, and often war-assisted process subjugating, dominating, and often annihilating many of those 
social forces that stood in its way – processes that continue to this day.” (12) For example, the focus on Britain's 
earlier period of colonisation in India in chapter 7 puts the accent on the strategic and military advantages it gained 
from its victory over the Mughal Empire as a 'key precondition to Europe's later rise to global pre-eminence.' (246-
247) 
5 Rosenberg, 1994; Halliday and Rosenberg, 1998 
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gradual acceptance of the overarching structural level of analysis they so forcefully identified in the 
subjects of their critiques.6  
Anievas and Nişancıoğlu follow Matin in arguing for 'a general social theory' in which capital is 'the 
product of the interactive multiplicity of the social' (40).7 HWCR's definition of capitalism - as an 
intersocietal set of social relations that coercively reproduces itself - reveals this condition of asserting 'the 
problematic of the international' (41) as a given of the expansion of social relations. They lament existing 
approaches for their lack of a theory of the 'coexistence and interaction of a multiplicity of societies as a 
distinct domain of 'geo-social' developmental pressures, behavioural patterns and causal dynamics' (41). 
This lack coupled to a focus on Europe can give rise to 'methodological internalism', 'historical priority', 
'linear developmentalism', and 'universal stagism' (41), which all lead to a Eurocentric approach to social 
relations.  
If the authors rightfully request a 'direct engagement with the question of what “the international” is' (42), 
the U&CD approach they put forward conflates the history of international relations with that of 
international law. In other words, the authors’ drive to counter Eurocentrism takes the history of legal 
sovereignty back from 1648 to 1492. This is a missed opportunity to reflect on rich critical histories of 
legal international processes that need to be carefully disentangled - in the early modern period - from 
historicising the origins of capitalism. In spite of the urgent need to develop a non-Eurocentric historical 
sociology of modernity, it is nevertheless a risk to put Eurocentrism at the absolute methodological 
forefront of a history of the origins of capitalism or international law. It leads to generalising other 
aspects of state formation and rule under a broader umbrella and thus misses crucial dimensions of the 
history of legal sovereignty and imperialism. This review article therefore explores some of these 
dimensions through the concept of jurisdictional accumulation in the context of the Castilian, French and 
British empires, so as to disaggregate them from the history of capitalism. 
Jurisdictional accumulation refers to political and economic processes that were neither fixed by territory 
nor by sovereignty but created multiple jurisdictional claims (in contrast to the later establishment of 
territorial sovereignty claimed by nineteenth century states). In the simplest terms, jurisdictional 
accumulation reveals the extent to which the early modern world was 'up for grabs' and the myriad ways 
actors 'grabbed' it. The concept emphasises a form of expansion that innovates legally while remaining 
tied to practical conditions and limited in terms of opportunities for establishing sovereignty and rights.8 
																																								 																				
6 See for example Rosenberg, 2013. For comprehensive critiques of the theoretical and epistemological structure of 
U&CD see Teschke 2014 and Rioux 2015. 
7 Matin, 2013 
8 The sense of jurisdiction retained here is that of the de facto, pre-legal phase of the enunciation of rules and laws. It 
also emphasises the messier imbrication of law, politics, economics and morality in these processes, as the territorial 
and administrative boundaries we tend to associate with those terms remain in the early modern period very elusive 
and overlapping. 
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Vignettes of this process - taken from three European empires central to the history of international law9 
- are shown to highlight some of the inconsistencies and incoherencies in Marxist histories of 
international law that remain tied to a structuralist and 'externalist' approach to the origins of capitalism. 
This article defends Political Marxism (PM) against some of Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 's arguments - 
especially in regards to the problem of internalism. However, it also provides a basis for some 
methodological and historical challenges to this approach, which tends to ignore the specificities of 
colonial legal processes - in their jurisdictional forms - as constitutive of social property relations and of 
transitions in sovereignty and state formation. 
The first section explores the problem of ‘the international’ by questioning the notion of internalism and 
turning to the concept of social-property relations that remains misunderstood in HWCR. If an 
'internationalist historiography' (41) is a necessary approach to Eurocentrism, U&CD's exclusionary 
condition hides the ways in which the concept of social-property relations can account for non-internal or 
intersocietal processes. The second section empirically substantiates the methodological critique by 
breaking down the relationship between jurisdictional and sovereign practices - rather than assuming their 
combined and exclusively 'external' or secondary role in the expansion of capitalism. Feudal, absolutist, 
and colonial jurisdictional disputes in the Spanish, French and British empires were processes primarily 
concerned with personal accumulation of authority - i.e. mostly privileges characterised as internal social 
relations in the more abstract sense redefined below. 
In fine, HWCR presents a history of international relations that trades off methodological openness and 
legal complexity for a structural and exclusive consequentialism driven by anti-Eurocentrism. Thus, if it 
achieves its first tasks of enriching existing historical debates and driving anti-Eurocentrism to the core of 
IR and historical sociology, it falls short on its more ambitious theoretical goal of proving the necessary 
combination of those tasks. 
The Problem of 'The International' 
First, it is helpful to retrace Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 's critique of historical materialist approaches. Their 
focus on Wallerstein's World System Theory (WST) follows Robert Brenner's critique of this approach as 
an ahistorical model that 'assumes precisely what needs to be explained' (21). In spite of its merits in 
shifting the world-system to a position of 'primary ontological unit of analysis' (22) for historical 
sociology, WST fails to theorise the 'international' through the mediation of non-European agents (16). It 
therefore cannot overcome Eurocentrism since it "involves writing the history of the 'periphery' out of 
the history of the 'core'' (18). Moreover, it reproduces a Smithian commercialisation model of exchange 
and production, which draws a picture of continuity for the expansion of quantitative economic 
development but cannot explain specific shifts and transitions in modes or relations of production.  
																																								 																				
9 The Dutch Empire is not addressed in this review, but will be the subject of analysis in the author's forthcoming 
monograph Jurisdictional Accumulation: An Early Modern History of Law, Empires and Capital. 
2 01 7   P A L  
5 	
	
H o w e v er,  A ni e v as  a n d Ni ş a n cı o ğ l u ar g u e  t h at  Br e n n er's  a n s w er  t o  W S T's  f ail ur es  is  as  pr o bl e m ati c. 
Br e n n er's t h esis is c o nsi d er e d m et h o d ol o gi c all y i nt er n alist a n d t h us f alls pr e y t o E ur o c e ntris m's hist ori c al 
pri oritisi n g  of  t h e  c or e  ( 5;  2 5)  or  w ors e  i n  t his  c as e,  E n gl a n d.  T h e  c o n c er n  f or  t h e orisi n g  t h e 
'i nt er n ati o n al' r e m ai ns: ' n o w h er e d o es "t h e i nt er n ati o n al " e nt er i nt o Br e n n er's t h e or eti c al pr es u p p ositi o ns' 
( 2 4). Br e n n er's t h esis is b ot h s p ati all y a n d t e m p or all y t o o n arr o w - w hil e W S T is t o o br o a d ( 3 0). 1 0  N ot 
o nl y  d o es  it  n ot  pr o vi d e  t h e or eti c al  s c o p e  t o  e x pl ai n  t h e  d e v el o p m e nt  of  c a pit alis m  as  a  pri m aril y 
'i nt er n ati o n al' p h e n o m e n o n, b ut it c o m mits t h e d o u bl e cri m e of ' er asi n g' ( 3 0) or ' o blit er ati n g t h e hist ori es 
of c ol o ni alis m, sl a v er y a n d i m p eri alis m' a n d t h us 'fr e e z es c a pit alis m's hist or y' ( 2 4). P M  is t h us at ris k of 
s y n c hr o ni c a n al ysis a n d of r e pr o d u ci n g a ' p oliti cs o f m y o pi a', u n a bl e t o ' e x p os e, criti cis e a n d dis m a ntl e' 
f or ms of o p pr essi o n ( 3 1). I n ot h er w or ds, b y l o c ati n g t h e ori gi ns of c a pit alis m i n E n gl a n d a n d d e v el o pi n g 
t h e c o n c e pt of s o ci al-pr o p ert y r el ati o ns , P M m a k es it i m p ossi bl e t o t h e oris e t h e 'r el ati o ns hi p b et w e e n 't h e 
i nt er n ati o n al' a n d c a pit alis m' ( 3 2).  
I n r es p o ns e t o H W C R ’s criti q u e of P M, S p e n c er Di m m o c k l a m e nts t h eir n e ar -c o m pl et e disr e g ar d f or t h e 
e m piri c al s p e cifi citi es of E n gl a n d at t h e b asis of Br e n n er's t h esis. T h e ar g u m e nt  i n H W C R , h e ar g u es, is 
n ot  c o n c er n e d  wit h  ' e m piri c al  r e aliti es'  b ut  wit h  t h e  c o n c e pt u al  a bstr a cti o ns  as  n e c ess aril y  ' n ot -
i nt er n ati o n al' b e c a us e l o c at e d i n a s p e cifi c g e o gr a p hi c al a n d t e m p or al c o nj u n ct ur e. Di m m o c k s h o ws t h at 
t his is pr o bl e m ati c e m piri c all y as w ell as t h e or eti c all y, i n t h at it miss es cr u ci al g e o p oliti c al di m e nsi o ns of 
Br e n n er's t h esis as w ell as B e n n o T es c h k e's l at er a n al ys es. 1 1  T o b ett er u n d erst a n d t h es e diff er e n c es, t h e 
f oll o wi n g l o o ks m or e cl os el y at t h e c o n c e pt of i nt er n alis m a n d h o w it is us e d i n H W C R . T his pr o vi d es a 
w a y t o n a vi g at e o ut of t h e m et h o d ol o gi c al i m p ass es i n w hi c h s c h ol ars of t h e ori gi ns of c a pit alis m h a v e 
i n cr e asi n gl y b e c o m e st u c k. 
‘I nt er n alis m’ is us e d i n H W C R  t o d es cri b e t w o s e p ar at e f ail ur es f o u n d i n e xisti n g a p pr o a c h es. T h e first 
f ail ur e is t h e o nt ol o gi c al a bs e n c e of n o n-E ur o p e a n s o ci eti es i n hist ori es of c a pit alis m a n d m o d er nit y a n d 
t h e c o ns e q u e nt ass o ci atio n  of  E ur o p e wit h ‘t h e i nt er n al’. T h e s e c o n d is t h e m et h o d ol o gi c al ‘ "i nsi d e -o ut " 
m o d el  of  s o ci al  c a us alit y’  w h er e  d e v el o p m e nt  is  ‘ e n d o g e n o us  a n d  s elf -pr o p elli n g’,  w h er e  E ur o p e  ( or 
E n gl a n d) is c o nsi d er e d ‘ c or e’ a n d ‘ pri m e m o v er’ a n d c a n als o b e i m pli e d as m or all y a n d c ult ur all y s u p eri or 
( 4-5). T his s e c o n d f ail ur e  –  w hi c h is t h e m ost diffi c ult t o a d dr ess a n d t h e o n e w e will f o c us o n - is e q u at e d 
wit h  t h e  ‘ d o m esti c  a n al o g y’  f all a c y  ( 4 1)  w h er e  i nt er n alis m  a n d  e xt er n alis m  b ot h  l e a d  t o  e xtr a p ol ati n g 
s o ci al r el ati o ns ‘fr o m a n al yti c al c at e g ori es d eri v e d fr o m a s o ci et y c o n c ei v e d i n t h e o ntologic ally si ng ul ar f or m’ 
( 4 1; ori gi n al e m p h asis).  
T h e  l a c k of cl arit y i n t h es e u n d erst a n di n gs of i nt er n alis m o p er at es o n t w o l e v els . Firstl y, i n b ot h t y p es of 
f ail ur e i d e ntifi e d b y  H W C R , t h e i nt er n al r ef ers - at v ari o us ti m es t hr o u g h o ut t h e b o o k - t o E ur o p e as a 
si n gl e  e ntit y a n d  t o E ur o p e  as  t h e  s p e cifi cs  of v ari o us  E ur o p e a n  p oliti es . T his  is  n ot  a  f u n d a m e nt al 
																																																												
1 0  Si mil arl y, C alli ni c os a n d R o yl e ( 2 0 1 4) a c c us e Br e n n er’s a p pr o a c h  - P M - of b ei n g e c c e ntri c all y n arr o w w hil e P M’s 
c o -f o u n d er W o o d ( 2 0 1 4) a c c us es c o ns e q u e nti alists of s e ei n g c a pit alis m e v er y w h er e. 
1 1  Di m m o c k,  2 0 1 7;  2 0 1 4.  T es c h k e,  2 0 0 3.  S e e  t h e  c o ntri b uti o n  b y  P ost  ( X X X X)  i n  t his  s y m p osi u m  f or  f urt h er 
ar g u m e nts a g ai nst A ni e v as a n d Ni a n ci o l u’s criti q u e of P M. 
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methodological problem, and could be easily addressed. More problematically, however, is the level at 
which internalism refers to a failure of causality, and the two types of causality the authors equate to each 
other. Specifically, internalism refers to on the one hand a domestic analogy, e.g. a development from A to B 
and A to C (from Europe A to colony B and Europe A to colony C) and, on the other, a different form 
of outward or inside-out causality, which implies a movement from the singular to the plural, e.g. 
development from A to A+B+C (from Europe to 'the Rest'). These causal logics – the domestic analogy 
and the singular to the plural - need to be more clearly differentiated. Before discussing in the historical 
section how conflating these various meanings of ‘internalism’ tends to misrepresent the histories of legal 
sovereignty and capitalism, the following will further discuss their methodological implications for the 
concept of social property relations in PM and for Marxist histories of international law. 
Dimmock reiterates Brenner's definition of social-property relations – Political Marxists’ preferred term 
for ‘social relations of production’ - as encompassing a ‘three-way dialectical relationship between the 
direct producers and nature (raw materials, ecology), the ‘vertical’ exploitative social relation between the 
direct producer and the appropriator of the producer’s surplus, and also the ‘horizontal’ social relation 
within [and between] the main classes’.12 Neither of these relations is limited a priori by internal or external 
conditions but they all are central for the construction of political spatiality. As Teschke shows, universal 
general abstractions are particularly unhelpful for rehearsing the transitions from feudal spatial relations - 
defined by multiple and differentiated lordly claims to vassalages and fiefdoms and the absence of 
absolute territorial jurisdiction - to the construction of dynastic-absolutist sovereignty in which multiple 
political claims to territories become gradually disentangled.13 Since borders are largely defined by 
personal relations of power during the early modern era, the notions of internal and external borders are 
meaningless across Europe for at least until the 17th-18th century. Lords exercise personal sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over subjects located in discontiguous territories, while vassalage and serfdom are not 
territorially fixed and depend on various vertical, horizontal and ‘natural’ conditions.14 Although slowly 
disappearing by the 17th century, these personal ties continue to determine the levy of taxes and access to 
the law up until the French Revolution. One has to wait for the mid-19th century for the concepts of 
internal/external to be applied in the more global sense required by U&CD, i.e. encompassing both logics 
of ‘domestic analogy’ (A to B) and ‘singular to plural’ (A to A+B+C). 
If this problem of when to date the inside/outside can be countered by arguing that the determination of 
any inside/outside is necessarily a relative phenomenon, it may be more useful to focus more on the ways 
																																								 																				
12 Dimmock, 2017 
13 Teschke 1998 
14 Moreover, the differences between sovereignty and jurisdiction (let alone the various meanings of sovereignty 
across the period and political contexts) remain largely unexplored by Marxist scholarship, even though the concept 
of social property relations and some work by PM scholars does provide a basis from which to make sense of these 
differences. The methodological contribution of PM here is to analyse legal history and the grainy differences 
between legal processes without losing the vantage point of how both sovereignty and jurisdiction are part of, as 
Wood now famously wrote, 'a continuous structure of social relations and forms with varying degrees of distance 
from the immediate processes of production and appropriation, beginning with those relations and forms that 
constitute the system of production itself' (1995: 25) 
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in which these approaches 'factor in the outside'; 15 in other words, the problem of ‘the international’. 
Political Marxists, as exemplified above, make strong empirical claims about the contested emergence of 
social-property relations in specific spatial and temporal conditions. However, they do not put forward a 
general theory under which all modern development must be subsumed. Rather, they propose an 
approach that traces the open-ended construction of historical phenomena and prioritises radical 
historicity and agency.16 To claim that a PM approach should insure an analysis in which the conceptual 
and empirical necessarily correspond - i.e. where the inside or outside can be 'factored' in a priori, or where 
capitalism must be as big as possible so as to encompass the most non-Eurocentric cases possible - would 
be misunderstanding PM's methodological assumptions; rather, no theory can ever be completely safe 
from the inadequacy of the theory/history relation. Anievas and Nişancıoğlu acknowledge this (277-8), 
even though their discussions of U&CD's critics seem to put this disclaimer aside. It is helpful to recall 
Knafo’s argument regarding the agency-structure ‘problem’, according to which a return to agency is not 
a solution – as problem-solving positivist theories assume: ‘The main significance of agency is 
methodological in that it provides a principle of critical rigour to avoid reification’.17 Similarly, applying 
this to the origins of capitalism implies avoiding single ‘solutions’ to Eurocentrism and accepting 
methodological choices informed by historical contingency. 
Thus, to understand the intersocietal dimensions of early modern social-property relations and the 
transitions from feudal to absolutist regimes in continental Europe, PM developed the concepts of 
‘geopolitical accumulation’ and ‘parcellised sovereignty’ - without losing sight of the multiplicity of actors 
involved in the construction of the European inter-state order.18 Instead, through an a priori abstraction of 
the international, ‘understood and theorised in its own substantive historical and sociological terms’ (42), 
HWCR conflates ontological definitions of the internal (at times Europe, others England) and 
misrepresents the logic of causality of a social-property relations approach to early modernity. Since 
geopolitical accumulation and parcellised sovereignty convey territorial multiplicities specific to the early-
modern period, they cannot simply be understood through the distinctively modern internalist concepts 
of domestic analogies or as categories derived from an ‘ontologically singular form’. 
In effect, neither causal logic does justice to the early modern period. Nevertheless, it is the task of 
Marxist scholars to ‘critically elaborate’ and ‘dialectically incorporate’ bourgeois categories before the 
possibility of transcending them.19 Thus, HWCR’s methodological weakness here should not be 
overstated, as it uses bourgeois analogies in an effort to transcend them non-Eurocentrically. However, 
the following argues that it compromises on the history of international law to make an argument about 
international relations and capitalism that fits the framework of U&CD and excludes how other 
approaches may understand the international or ‘factor in the outside’.  
																																								 																				
15 I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for this formulation and emphasis. 
16 Wood, 1981; Knafo and Teschke, 2017 
17 Knafo, 2010: 494 
18 Teschke, 2003 
19 Wood, 1995: 23 
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Turning to international law, since the pioneering work of non-European and non-American lawyers in 
the 1960s and 1970s, histories that examine colonialism and empire have become a rich field of study. 
From theories of legal imperialism,20 to legal pluralist narratives21 and postcolonial studies,22 Eurocentrism 
has become an analytical hub for international legal history.23 For one of its leading critical scholars, 
Martti Koskenniemi, there are four strategies currently being deployed to overcome Eurocentrism in this 
field: 1) tell the story of international law’s ‘gruesome’ colonial engagement and imperial project; 2) 
emphasise the colonial origins of institutions that have been thought of as ‘European’; 3) to think ‘in 
terms of hybrids of colonial and anti-colonial ideas and uses’ of international law’s inherited vocabulary; 
and 4) reject the notion of European histories as universal world histories and focus on ‘provincialising 
Europe'.24  
HWCR delivers on Koskenniemi's last account for tackling Eurocentrism: accordingly, U&CD 'provides 
an illuminating framework, through which we can decentre or provincialise Europe as the privileged or 
sole author of history' (276). However, Koskenniemi’s approach to Eurocentrism in the discipline of IL is 
to think of the various attempts to overcome Eurocentrism holistically, i.e. not as excluding each other 
but as parts of a common ideological project. Although Koskenniemi flirts with Marxist approaches to 
IL, he remains, especially for more orthodox Marxists, too far outside the perimeters of what such an 
approach necessarily entails.25 Ground-breaking works in the last decades have shown that Marxist 
approaches to IL are slowly gaining more ground.26 They gather critiques of IL as necessarily co-
determined with capitalism (e.g. Miéville) as well as critiques accounting for the potential of social 
movements and non-Western actors to engage with law as a means of resistance (e.g. Rajagopal; Cutler 
and Gill).  
However, this growth remains limited in comparison to the influence of Global Legal Pluralism,27 which 
Brophy discusses very usefully from a Marxist critique based on U&CD.28 It is not possible to fully do 
justice to her arguments here. However it is useful to note that alongside U&CD - as a way to counter the 
liberalism of legal pluralism - she quotes Wood to justify the need to provide 'the overarching totality of 
capitalism as a social system'.29 This misrepresents Wood's approach for which Marxism must be 
																																								 																				
20 Miéville, 2005; Chimni, 2007 
21 Benton and Ross, 2013 
22 Pahuja, 2011 
23 See forthcoming Spanish handbook on imperialism and International Law by leading Anglophone critical scholars 
(Eslava, Obregón and Urueña). On the Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law’s difficulties in overcoming 
Eurocentrism, see Martineau, 2014. 
24 Koskenniemi, 2013: 224-226  
25 Koskenniemi, 2008 
26 Chimi, 1993; Cutler, 2003; Rajagopal, 2003; Miéville, 2005; Bowring, 2008; Marks, 2008; Knox, 2009; Neocleous, 
2012; Cutler and Gill, 2015 
27 Benton and Ross, 2013; Benton, 2010. 
28 Brophy, 2017 
29 Wood, 1995: 260 in Brophy, 2017: 9 
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historicist before asserting any claim to totality, as her debates on the history of the European so-called 
bourgeois revolutions loudly emphasise.30  
Thus, can we reconcile Wood’s – and by extension PM’s - historicism with the U&CD critique of legal 
pluralism? Or is Brophy’s equation of Wood’s totality with U&CD the only answer to counter liberal 
histories of international law? For Wood, a social property relations approach does not imply renouncing 
‘the totality of capitalism’. Instead, it advances that this totality should not be deduced from a 
consequentialist notion of development. If Anievas and Nişancıoğlu warn against the dangers of 'linear 
developmentalism' and 'universal stagism' (41), this should also apply to the development of international 
law. Brophy provides the basis to a much more nuanced theoretical application of U&CD for 
international law and warns against its tendencies for abstract circularity. However, the more difficult 
narratives of the origins of capitalism and of early modern multiple territorialities remain ignored so as to 
focus on what she terms ‘the underlying reality’ that the ‘UCD of capitalism is simultaneously the UCD of 
law’31 in order to prove that law is ‘intrinsic, not tangential to capitalism’.32 For a Political Marxist 
approach, such a view is antithetical to an account of the origins of capitalism – or of the origins of 
international law – that can conceptualise the plurality of capitalist and non-capitalist spaces, or the 
presence of law without capitalism. It is therefore impossible to account for the history of the early 
modern period if what is meant to be explained – how law became capitalist – is already assumed a 
priori.33  
For their many flaws, legal pluralists provide useful empirical bases from which to explore the territorial 
and jurisdictional multiplicities of the early modern era, and thereby enrich the colonial dimensions of the 
concept of social property relations.Using Eurocentrism as the immediate and central epistemological 
criterion for HWCR's critique of historical sociology – taking it as ‘the whole truth’ - has come at a price. 
Although it provides the authors with a structurally coherent system, the self-fulfilling equation of U&CD 
forces a theoretical exclusion of all other approaches to non-Eurocentrism. If HWCR develops a system 
according to which U&CD solves the Eurocentric dilemma, it consequently slips into an objective 
historicism that forgets the open methodological requirements of ‘understanding as a historically effected 
																																								 																				
30 Wood, 2016 (and Pal, 2016 for an introduction to Wood's arguments contra the concept of bourgeois revolution). 
These debates are further discussed in the section below. 
31 Brophy, 2017: 22 
32 Ibid. 19 
33 This process of explaining development from the starting point of a theoretical abstraction such as U&CD can be 
called a hermeneutic disjuncture. This can be explained by referring to Gadamer’s argument that ‘real historical 
thinking must take account of its own historicity.’ This ‘reality’ is both that of ‘history’ and of ‘historical 
understanding’, and implies a unity of the ‘historical object’ and its ‘phantom’ objective counterpart (Gadamer, 2004: 
299-300). By failing to account for the disjuncture between history and historicity, ‘we more or less forget half of 
what is really there – in fact, we miss the whole truth of the phenomenon – when we take its immediate appearance 
as the whole truth.’ (Ibid.) 
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event’, i.e. as a process mediated by existing categories but also subject to methodological choice and 
historical contingency.34  
This first section has argued that the ‘intersocietal’ condition in HWCR is theoretically undermined 
through firstly a misrepresentation of the social-property relations approach and secondly the adoption of 
an exclusively structural and conflated approach to the histories of capitalism and international law 
blinded by the urge to solve Eurocentrism. The next section turns to the history of legal sovereignty and 
to some of the differences between Spanish, French and British colonial and metropolitan jurisdictional 
practices. It shows that the history of international law – specifically the relationship between sovereignty 
and jurisdiction in the expansion of modernity and capitalism - cannot be exclusively based on external or 
intersocietal legal relations, or on a conflated ‘domestic analogy/singular to plural’ notion of internalism. 
Early Modern Legal Sovereignties 
Substantial chapters and sections of HWCR are devoted to the development of sovereignty and imperial 
expansion in their legal forms. This focus is especially welcome as the law remains under-theorised in 
Marxism. However, generalising the legal relations and practices for asserting sovereignty through which 
the West came to 'rule' and correlating these to the 'geopolitical origins of capitalism' misses crucial 
contradictions and struggles of jurisdictional multiplicity - particularly in the Spanish, French and British 
imperial contexts. Put simply, the history of the legal practices and struggles through which the West 
came to rule needs to be differentiated from that of the origins of capitalism.  
By systematically misrepresenting PM’s approach as methodologically internalist, HWCR misses the 
specific ‘internalist’ movement of jurisdictional disputes, and thus the role of law in the origins and 
expansion of capitalism. I use the term internalist here in a more abstract sense to refer to processes of 
development whose logic of causality is outward (i.e. agents determined by conditions local to their social 
occupations and status and whose agency has potential effects outside of that locality) but is not spatially 
restricted to Europe or European actors, in contrast to the conflated senses used in HWCR. Arguing for 
the sui generis character of specific social relations of space – rather than insisting on the metaphysics of 
the internal/external distinction – hopes to stress the inadequacy of this dichotomy as it reflects a static 
and exclusive conceptualisation of transitional practices. In other words, the PM concept of social 
property relations refuses to associate its focus on origins with a static or fixed sense of internalism (e.g. 
Europe or England). Instead, the focus on origins can be understood as a focus on multiple processes 
and movements such as early modern multiple territorialities, or – a dimension less explored by PM 
scholars – colonial jurisdictional struggles.35 
																																								 																				
34 Gadamer, 2004: 299 
35 Lacher, 2006 
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Jurisdiction can be understood as a practice constitutive of sovereignty.36 These two processes constituted 
separate principles of early modern political theory that help to understand the specificities and 
institutional divergences of feudal and absolutist social-property relations – and specifically the different 
notions of internal and external they reflect. The concept of jurisdictional disputes helps to focus on the 
processes that make individual actors, groups, and institutions determine themselves or be determined by 
others as either jurisdictional or sovereign (i.e. as claiming de facto authority or as establishing de jure 
legitimacy to one's authority). Jurisdictional conflicts form one of the bases of PM’s apparatus to 
understand the multiplicity, combination and unevenness of Western political and legal institutions. 37 The 
contribution of this concept is to emphasise firstly the focus on contestation, and secondly the more 
privilege-based and personal social-property relations specific to early modernity concerned with 
accumulating or preserving de facto jurisdictional power. The relationship between sovereignty and 
jurisdiction is used here as a useful indicator of the differences between Spanish, French and British 
empires and the various strategies they used to assert their authority and rule. Examples from each case 
will now be discussed in turn in relation to claims made in HWCR. 
In the case of Spain or more specifically the Castilian empire, the origins of international law – i.e. legal 
and territorial sovereignty - and the origins of capitalism do not coincide. Moreover, internal jurisdictional 
conflicts play a much stronger role in determining concepts of sovereignty - especially in the early days of 
the Conquista - than pressure from Amerindians as an intersocietal condition.38 However, Anievas and 
Nişancıoğlu situate the origins of territorial sovereignty in the first encounters with Amerindians. They 
provide a useful and well researched narrative of various legal processes occurring during the 15th and 16th 
centuries often ignored by historical sociology. However, they assume that this European struggle to 
subjugate and eradicate Amerindians prefigures jurisdictional struggles specific to the European 
continent, which will later shape the early modern empires as independent sovereign states. By exploring 
the 'discoveries and the socio-economic and geopolitical relations they produced' - through concepts of 
'structural unevenness', 'differentiated developmental trajectories', and 'co-constitution' (121-122) - their 
argument is consistent with an approach that rejects ideal-types. However, it remains a structural 
approach that focuses on the history of capitalism and law as a succession of stages (i.e. the shift from 
non-modern to modern sovereignty as a marker of non-European co-constitution), and which 
																																								 																				
36 In international law, modern territorial sovereignty is defined as the “right to exercise authority over a territory 
and the status to enter into international agreements” (Çali, 2010). Jurisdiction is defined as the “actual exercise of 
control and authority by a state” (Milanovic, 2011: 8); and as “de facto political and legal authority; that is to say, 
practical political and legal authority that is not yet legitimate or justified” (Besson, 2012: 864). See Dorsett and 
McVeigh (2012) for a historical application of this particular definition of the concept of jurisdiction. See Pal 
(forthcoming) for a fuller analysis of the distinction between sovereignty and jurisdiction and theories of 
international law and IR. 
37 For classic definitions and applications of the concept of jurisdictional conflicts to the divergent trajectories of 
France and England out of feudalism, see Wood (1991: 71; 2012: 20-23). 
38 It is crucial to stress the specific relationships between the Iberian kingdoms and the Castilian crown, which 
constituted the most centralised, authoritarian, and militaristic of these states (Anderson, 1974: 60-84). Moreover, 
since Castile conquered the colonies, these legally constituted an extension of its crown. Castilian merchants held the 
monopoly of all trade coming to and from the Atlantic, and the Spanish Habsburg empire was in fact a Castilian 
empire, emphasising again the importance of the internalist logic for understanding Spanish colonialism. 
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inadvertently subsumes the history of legal relations as subordinate to a commodity and coercion based 
history of capitalism. In other words, since they discuss legal coercion over Amerindians as the basis to 
economic plunder and imperial competition and/or alliance, and locate it as an instance of the 
intersocietal origins of capitalism, both histories of legal processes and of capitalism appear conflated. 
This is only possible if one subordinates all forms of legal agency to economic pressures or imperatives, 
which is not consistent with the political conditions and moral/ethical imperatives of the Castilian 
Empire.  
Firstly, the discussion in chapter 5 of the role of jurists in reconceptualising 'universality based on an 
ontological distinction between Europeans and 'Indians'' (122) is useful and important in light of the 
particular weight of legal thought in Spanish imperial politics. However, the claim that this led to the 
'development of the modern legal principle of sovereignty' (Ibid.) is exaggerated and ignores 
overwhelming research showing how Scholastic thought was specifically non-modern.39 Legal historians 
and historians of political thought have been at pains to show the differences between Grotius and the 
Spanish theologians, and debates continue about the manifold interpretations and conceptual links 
between these scholars.40 Regardless of the specifics of these debates, reproducing a developmental linear 
homogeneity between these scholars and their epochs is symptomatic of a slip into presentism that 
Anievas and Nişancıoğlu otherwise claim to reject. Moreover, it ignores the role of Portuguese merchants 
in the struggles over the empire's decisions on how to expand. Exploring the particular social property 
relations determining 17th century Spanish expansion reveals the role of Portuguese merchants in shaping 
the practices of the Spanish empire. In effect, the Castilian Crown and Spanish nobility struggled against 
the Portuguese vision of how to conduct overseas trade and its implications for the boundaries and 
management of the empire. Portuguese merchants put forward a more open conception of the 'economy' 
more separate from the state than the Spanish nobility could envisage from their more legalist Scholastic 
doctrine, based on a policy of 'retrenchment and closure'.41 In effect, the Castilian struggles and debates 
against the Portuguese merchants and diaspora (who constituted a large proportion of settlers in the 
conquered Americas) illustrate different jurisdictional strategies and contributed to shaping the 
jurisdictional reach of the Spanish empire in a way that, failing to take on the Portuguese's more open 
vision, entrenched its economic decline.42 
Secondly, the picture of Spain as a united political force excluding Amerindians from their polity is 
misplaced. The process of dominating, exploiting and eradicating their culture was integrated as a part of 
imperial strategy and specifically, as part of the Hispanic kingdoms’ legal morality of rule. Moreover, the 
different Iberian kingdoms were involved in fierce competition and struggles between themselves.43 This 
																																								 																				
39 Hamilton, 1963; Dickason, 1989; Tuck, 1999; Koskenniemi, 2001; Keene, 2002; Jahn, 2000, 2006, Pagden, 2003. 
For example, for Miéville (2005: 187), Vittoria’s concept of sovereignty was ‘subjective and medieval’. 
40 Koskenniemi, 2011 
41 Studnicki-Gizbert 2007: 12-13. 
42 Studnicki-Gizbert 2007: 133-4 
43 Owens, 2005; Rosenberg, 1994; Anderson, 1974.  
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translated into a concern with establishing legal justifications for the colonisation, the close role of 
theologians to the monarchs and in the hierarchy of power, as well as the crucial role of lawyers in the 
requirimiento and in drawing the legal codes for the Indies.44 These legal strategies reproduced feudal 
relations of power, i.e. personal relationships of subordination in encomiendas alongside a complex 
mechanism of agricultural production. These semi-feudal relations were observed in the political relations 
between encomenderos (the conquistadores who were given authority over encomiendas) and the monarchy, and 
between encomenderos and Amerindians (as slaves or serfs). 
These legal justifications played out famously in the Valladolid debate between missionary priest 
Bartolome de Las Casas and theologian Juan Gines de Sepúlveda, whose arguments were strongly 
influenced by European struggles over reformism.45 These struggles were meant to assert Habsburg rulers 
over the Pope, by making a distinction between fighting Muslims (who couldn’t be converted and were 
hence deemed infidels) and the missionary justification of American colonisation (Amerindians as 
incapacites, i.e. infants who needed guidance and whose rights needed to be guarded). In light of the 
importance of these jurisdictional processes - i.e. struggles to assert authority - it is more helpful to 
understand Iberian strategies of imperial expansion as jurisdictional - rather than primitive or capitalist - 
accumulation.46 This asserts the role of political and ethical imperatives and emphasises the role of 
lawyers and theologians, as well as the fluidity and diversity of legal techniques and solutions to the 
challenges of empire.47  
Finally, in regards still to the role of indigenous tribes in the Spanish empire, it is useful to look at the 
experience of Spanish settlers in colonial Mexico in their triangular legal relations with indigenous groups 
and the metropole represented by royal legal institutions. In effect, a 'Spanish legal system that had 
emerged under a given set of circumstances became a means to the negotiation of colonial difference'.48 
In other words, imperial expansion and consolidation was a legal struggle, while colonial Spain saw the 
emergence of overlapping legal concepts and practices, and the appropriation of land and resources as 
dependent on these struggles and practices.49 Specifically, Owensby shows by a close analysis of primary 
sources in colonial Mexico that Spain and its royal legal institutions defended in certain respects 
indigenous rights – and vice versa indigenous disputants invoked and relied on the institutions upheld by 
the Spanish crown - as a means to counter the growing independence and consequent lack of financial 
revenue from its settlers. Crucially here, this further frustrates the narrative in HWCR according to which 
Spain excluded Amerindians from its polity or concepts of sovereignty.   
																																								 																				
44 Pagden, 1990; 1995 
45 Hanke, 1974 
46 Pal, 2013 
47 For example, see Benton 2012 for a discussion of the concept of ‘possession’ as a jurisdictional strategy in the 
Spanish empire. 
48 Owensby, 2011: 1-48 
49 Ibid.: 31 
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Turning now to our second and third cases – France and Britain - Wood argues that theories of 
sovereignty in France were developed in reaction to the predominance of jurisdictional disputes as fetters 
to the development of capitalism.50 The struggles between the 17th and 19th centuries in France are 
testament to the difficulties of the nobility and bourgeoisie to suppress workers’ guilds,51 as well as the 
corporate orders of the legal profession52 and regional supreme courts (Parlements).53 The French ruling 
class, before and after the Revolution, was constantly in the process of repressing or collaborating so as to 
ensure its authority.54 This practice was reproduced in its colonies, where the Ancien Régime persisted after 
the Revolution and where metropolitan jurisdictional struggles were also played out.55 During the 17th and 
18th centuries, disputants in French colonies disposed of more personal judicial opportunities to settle 
disputes, firstly because the French reproduced autonomous but 'identical' juridical institutions in the 
colonies; secondly because these institutions kept very close links to the struggles over offices and their 
privileges taking place in the metropolitan context: “New France became a new judicial battleground 
where old legal conflicts over long-held privileges and customs in France could be fought – albeit with 
new stakes and conditions.”56 
Regarding the case of the French revolution discussed in Chapter 6, Anievas and Nişancıoğlu draw on an 
impressive list of statistics and figures regarding French industrial and commercial growth. However, they 
acknowledge that French absolutism remained dominated by its feudal aspects (353) and that ‘the 
growing socio-economic weight of French capitalists had not yet been transformed into the wielding of 
direct political power’ (352). PM rejects the characterisation of pre-1789 France as a capitalist 
revolutionary state, and emphasises the struggles during and following the revolution as feudal-absolutist 
in the sense of perpetuating personal and static privileges focused on noble land revenues and office-
holding.57 For Wood and PM more generally, the political revolution that occurred in France (and this 
applies to Britain too) did not transform French social property relations, and therefore the concept of 
bourgeois revolution belongs to a stagist and consequentialist approach to the history of capitalism.  
																																								 																				
50 Wood, 1991: 43-46 
51 Lafrance, 2013 
52 Burrage, 1988: 230-242 
53 Miller, 2008; Parker, 1989; 2003 
54 Beik, 2005 
55 Morin, 2010 
56 Dewar, 2013: 50. “There appears to have been a striking contrast between the metropolitan legal jurisdictions 
involved in English overseas disputes and French ones. Whereas parties in the latter frequently came before local 
admiralty courts, the English admiralty’s jurisdiction did not extend – in theory at least – to colonies but was limited 
to the sea itself. Contemporary disputes that I have examined seem to uphold this fact: factional conflicts within the 
Virginia Company, for example, drove disputants to the king and the Privy Council. In addition to metropolitan 
appeals, companies in the American colonies had their own general courts, a practice not seen in French America.” 
(Dewar, 2013: 78) 
57 Teschke, 2005; Wood, 1991; 2016; Gerstenberger, 2007. These debates cannot be fully rehearsed here, but they 
remain a vibrant subject for Marxist historians, as the symposium on Neil Davidson's How Revolutionary Were the 
Bourgeois Revolutions? (forthcoming in Historical Materialism) demonstrates with contributions by Charles Post and 
Heide Gerstenberger.  
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From a legal standpoint, work by Beik and Parker - which emphasises the persistence of office-holding, 
noble-land revenue, and therefore personal and static privileges PM’s arguments are based on - is even 
more convincing in light of Burrage’s analysis of the evolution of the legal professions in France (and 
again similarly in Britain).58 These three historians highlight a specific autonomy of the French legal 
profession rooted in the property of lawyers’ offices and the authority of their corporate orders, 
maintaining the struggles with the monarchy and state at a jurisdictional level. However, although the 
British legal profession also evolved autonomously, the social-property relations that shaped this 
autonomy were significantly different. This emphasises why it is crucial to focus on the emergence or 
origins of these processes, rather than their end result, i.e. autonomy. The evolution of the legal 
profession requires an internalist standpoint; otherwise all that is revealed is its consequent autonomy 
which misses the specific link and role of lawyers in upholding or contesting the ruling or capitalist class. 
In contrast, Anievas and Nişancıoğlu’s transitional concept of absolutism, which they qualify as ‘hybrid 
subsumption’ (366-367), remains closed to any historical evidence that highlights the role of internal 
jurisdictions. It therefore reproduces a consequentialist conception of history that PM scholars have 
argued to be at the core of the teleological concept of 'bourgeois revolution'.59  
Finally, in contrast, English state formation reveals a much more stable and symbiotic relationship 
between sovereignty and jurisdiction, mainly due to the relative absence of the concept of sovereignty in 
early modern English political thought.60 Moreover, once this relationship came to be questioned, the 
British opted for what we could call a 'pragmatic uncertainty', which contrasts with the French 
contradictory dichotomy of a post-1789 ideologically progressive empire and the reproduction of Ancien 
Régime personal privilege. Benton shows that late 19th century imperial agents (imperial administrators, 
colonial officials) struggled with an ongoing constitutional problem. This officially consisted in how to 
reconcile the emerging order of international law - based on independent territorial nation-states - with 
the political realities of imperial spaces and ‘divisible sovereignty’.61 The more deeply rooted material 
problem was of course how to reconcile the British expansion of markets with the control of territory and 
compliance - officially called ‘protection’ - of British subjects. Benton argues that faced with this dilemma 
disguised as a constitutional problem, perpetuating uncertainty through legal categories and typologies 
became the Colonial Office’s strategy to avoid taking over full legal authority in the colonies (she 
discusses this strategy mostly in the case of India, but it is not exclusive to it). The creation of ‘anomalous 
legal zones’ and the principle of 'bare sovereignty' were deployed, and thus ‘divisible sovereignty’ emerged 
in British legal thought based on the pragmatic principle of ‘usage’.62 
Similarly, the practice of 19th century extraterritoriality recognised colonies as ‘semi-sovereigns’ and gave 
them an illusion of juridical autonomy and collaboration by providing them with legal aides and fora 
																																								 																				
58 Burrage, 1988 
59 Teschke, 2005. Wood, 1991; 2016. 
60 Wood, 1991 
61 Benton, 2008 
62 Ibid. 
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through which their local legal systems could be slowly modernised, standardised, and finally eradicated.63 
The adoption of extraterritoriality as a ‘softer’ strategy of legal imperialism was, in the leading British case, 
largely driven ad hoc due to a lack of more direct and offensive strategies. The Colonial Office was 
disorganised and crucially there was no clear need from authorities and state representatives to assert or 
pursue their struggles over privileges through such means. ‘Men on the ground’ were usually left to their 
own devices, and if in trouble with local sovereigns or other colonial representatives, an extraterritorial 
agreement would be sought after and often reached.64 In other words, British jurisdictional practices were 
more often the fruit of local internal circumstances and lack of strategy, both in the metropolitan and 
colonial context. 
It is only possible to briefly discuss here these examples and to provide a mere glimpse of the 
jurisdictional struggles of the early modern to 19th century period. Nevertheless, these examples illustrate 
how rejecting internal factors - or not being clear enough on what types of internalism they reject - to 
explain specific struggles over sovereignty and jurisdiction leads Anievas and Nişancıoğlu to ignore 
fundamental characteristics of the relationship between capitalist expansion and legal imperialism. 
Specifically, these characteristics show how these two histories might benefit from being distinguished 
until their merging during the fuller expansion of capitalist relations of production and the emergence of a 
legal system of international states in the 19th century. Moreover, these examples illustrate the inadequacy 
of the internal/external dichotomy, since the privileges, judicial struggles, and the various divisions of 
sovereignty they encapsulate (from Spanish encomenderos, Mexican colonial courts, to French officials and 
British forms of extraterritoriality) fit neither category.  
Conclusion 
Anievas and Nişancıoğlu’s work is a useful addition to a critical field that still needs to make a more 
significant mark in the mainstream. It does so by providing ample evidence against the ahistorical 
reifications of (neo)-realism and the false universalisms of liberalism, the remaining pillars of 
contemporary IR theory. Thus, this work undeniably contributes to a richer social history and critique of 
modernity and capitalism by rattling social sciences’ ‘Eurocentric cage’. Going back to 1492 – and even 
back to the 13th Century Mongolian Empire – to explain the rise of capitalism and build a radical 
theorisation of internationalism is a bold move. However, it ignores important distinctions between 
jurisdiction and sovereignty revealed by scholarship in critical legal history. Instead of solving the 
internal/external fallacy of IR theory, Anievas and Nişancıoğlu’s approach uses this conceptual 
mechanism to caricature other approaches to historical sociology – in particular PM. Doing so neglects 
the spatialising potential of the concept of social-property relations in the Spanish, French and British 
early modern imperial legal contexts and underplays the distinctiveness of regionally specific jurisdictional 
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struggles over the definition of sovereignty. Crucially, this leads them to conflate the histories of 
international law and capitalism. 
HWCR also reflects a general tendency for scholars in historical sociology and IR to confine themselves 
to – and compete over – formal assertions of exclusive theoretical abstractions as primary analytical steps. 
The debate could be made more productive by accepting choices of methodological rigour; that is 
moving historical sociology away from totalising, competitive and exclusionary conceptions of capitalism 
towards focusing on comparing instances and trajectories of contested social-property relations. Despite 
these problems, HWCR achieves a great feat in providing a new and engaging platform for historical 
sociology - and specifically PM - to clarify its understanding of social-property relations, confront legal 
history, and further pursue the problem of the international. This will hopefully contribute to a more non-
Eurocentric critical elaboration and transcendence of bourgeois categories rather than winning a prize for 
the biggest capitalism. 
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